

Appendix A

	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
(1). AFFORDABILITY PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS					
	Actual	Approved	estimate	estimate	estimate
Capital Expenditure	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	83,607	97,112	171,573	115,385	12,637
Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream	%	%	%	%	%
	8.78	7.10	7.09	7.73	7.55
Gross borrowing requirement	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Gross Debt	363,424	362,274	362,274	352,274	332,274
Capital Financing Requirement as at 31 March	316,694	322,953	393,952	397,291	382,586
Under/(Over) Borrowing	(46,730)	(39,321)	31,678	45,017	50,312
In year Capital Financing Requirement	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	(2,668)	6,259	70,999	3,339	(14,705)
Capital Financing Requirement as at 31 March	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
	316,694	322,953	393,952	397,291	382,586
PRUDENTIAL INDICATOR	2016/17	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21
(2). TREASURY MANAGEMENT PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS					
	Approved	Approved	estimate	estimate	estimate
Authorised limit for external debt -	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Borrowing	497,346	549,049	516,818	532,824	527,178
other long term liabilities	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000	12,000
TOTAL	509,346	561,049	528,818	544,824	539,178
Operational boundary for external debt -	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000	£'000
Borrowing	414,455	457,540	430,681	444,020	439,315
other long term liabilities	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000
TOTAL	424,455	467,540	440,681	454,020	449,315
Upper limit for fixed interest rate exposure					
Net principal re fixed rate borrowing / fixed term investments	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Upper limit for variable rate exposure					
Net principal re fixed rate borrowing / fixed term investments	25%	25%	25%	25%	25%
Upper limit for total principal sums invested for over 365 days	£	£	£	£	£
(per maturity date)	£0	£0	£0	£0	£0
Maturity structure of new fixed rate borrowing during year	upper limit	lower limit			
under 12 months	20%	0%			
12 months and within 24 months	20%	0%			
24 months and within 5 years	60%	0%			
5 years and within 10 years	100%	0%			
10 years and above	100%	0%			
Maturity structure of new variable rate borrowing during year	upper limit	lower limit			
under 12 months	20%	0%			
12 months and within 24 months	20%	0%			
24 months and within 5 years	60%	0%			
5 years and within 10 years	100%	0%			
10 years and above	100%	0%			

PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS

Ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream

The ratio of financing costs to net revenue stream shows the estimated annual revenue costs of borrowing, less net interest receivable on investments, plus repayments of capital, as a proportion of annual income from council taxpayers and central government. The estimates of financing costs include current and future commitments based on the capital programme.

Gross Borrowing

Gross borrowing refers to the Authority's total external borrowing and other long term liabilities versus the Capital Financing Requirement.

Actual and Estimated Capital Expenditure

Actual and estimates of capital expenditure for the current and future years.

Capital Financing Requirement

The Capital Financing Requirement (CFR) represents capital expenditure financed by external debt and not by capital receipts, revenue contributions, capital grants or third party contributions at the time of spending. The CFR measures the Authority's underlying need to borrow externally for a capital purpose. The Authority has a treasury management strategy which accords with the CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services.

Authorised Limit

In respect of its external debt, the Authority approves authorised limits for its total external debt gross of investments. These limits separately identify borrowing from other long-term liabilities such as finance leases. Authorised Limits are consistent with the Authority's current commitments, service plans, proposals for capital expenditure and associated financing, cash flow and accord with the approved Treasury Management Policy statement and practices. The Authorised Limit is based on the estimate of most likely prudent, but not necessarily the worst case scenario and provides sufficient additional headroom over and above the Operational Boundary.

Operational Boundary

The Operational Boundary for external debt is based on the same estimates as the authorised limit but reflects the Head of Finance's estimate of the most likely, prudent but not worst case scenario, without the additional headroom included within the authorised limit to allow for unusual cash movements, and equates to the maximum of external debt projected by this estimate. The operational boundary represents a key management tool for in-year monitoring. Within the operational boundary, figures for borrowing and other long-term liabilities are separately identified.

Limits on Interest Rate Exposure

This means that the Authority will manage fixed and variable interest rate exposure within the ranges. This provides flexibility to take advantage of any favourable movements in interest rates.

Economic Commentary (Link's View)

Economic Background

GLOBAL OUTLOOK. World growth looks to be on an encouraging trend of stronger performance, rising earnings and falling levels of unemployment. In October, the IMF upgraded its forecast for world growth from 3.2% to 3.6% for 2017 and 3.7% for 2018.

In addition, **inflation prospects are generally muted** and it is particularly notable that **wage inflation** has been subdued despite unemployment falling to historically very low levels in the UK and US. This has led to many comments by economists that there appears to have been a fundamental shift downwards in the Phillips curve (this plots the correlation between levels of unemployment and inflation e.g. if the former is low the latter tends to be high). In turn, this raises the question of what has caused this? The likely answers probably lay in a combination of a shift towards flexible working, self-employment, falling union membership and a consequent reduction in union power and influence in the economy, and increasing globalisation and specialisation of individual countries, which has meant that labour in one country is in competition with labour in other countries which may be offering lower wage rates, increased productivity or a combination of the two. In addition, technology is probably also exerting downward pressure on wage rates and this is likely to grow with an accelerating movement towards automation, robots and artificial intelligence, leading to many repetitive tasks being taken over by machines or computers. Indeed, this is now being labelled as being the start of the **fourth industrial revolution**.

KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as Quantitative Easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

The key issue now is that that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation is coming towards its close and a new period has already started in the US, and more recently, in the UK, on reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and (for the US) reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of an on-going reduction in spare capacity in the economy, and of unemployment falling to such low levels that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this then also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. This resulted in bond markets and equity market prices both rising to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This, therefore, makes both asset categories vulnerable to a sharp correction. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years. They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, alternatively, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow

and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.**

There is also a potential key question over whether economic growth has become too dependent on strong central bank stimulus and whether it will maintain its momentum against a backdrop of rising interest rates and the reversal of QE. In the UK, a key vulnerability is the **low level of productivity growth**, which may be the main driver for increases in wages; and **decreasing consumer disposable income**, which is important in the context of consumer expenditure primarily underpinning UK GDP growth.

A further question that has come to the fore is whether **an inflation target for central banks of 2%**, is now realistic given the shift down in inflation pressures from internally generated inflation, (i.e. wage inflation feeding through into the national economy), given the above mentioned shift down in the Phillips curve.

- Some economists favour a shift to a **lower inflation target of 1%** to emphasise the need to keep the lid on inflation. Alternatively, it is possible that a central bank could simply 'look through' tepid wage inflation, (i.e. ignore the overall 2% inflation target), in order to take action in raising rates sooner than might otherwise be expected.
- However, other economists would argue for a **shift UP in the inflation target to 3%** in order to ensure that central banks place the emphasis on maintaining economic growth through adopting a slower pace of withdrawal of stimulus.
- In addition, there is a strong argument that central banks should **target financial market stability**. As mentioned previously, bond markets and equity markets could be vulnerable to a sharp correction. There has been much commentary, that since 2008, QE has caused massive distortions, imbalances and bubbles in asset prices, both financial and non-financial. Consequently, there are widespread concerns at the potential for such bubbles to be burst by exuberant central bank action. On the other hand, too slow or weak action would allow these imbalances and distortions to continue or to even inflate them further.
- Consumer debt levels are also at historically high levels due to the prolonged period of low cost of borrowing since the financial crash. In turn, this cheap borrowing has meant that **other non-financial asset prices**, particularly house prices, have been driven up to very high levels, especially compared to income levels. Any sharp downturn in the availability of credit, or increase in the cost of credit, could potentially destabilise the housing market and generate a sharp downturn in house prices. This could then have a destabilising effect on consumer confidence, consumer expenditure and GDP growth. However, no central bank would accept that it ought to have responsibility for specifically targeting house prices.

UK. After the UK surprised on the upside with strong economic growth in 2016, **growth in 2017 has been disappointingly weak**; quarter 1 came in at only +0.3% (+1.8% y/y), quarter 2 was +0.3% (+1.5% y/y) and quarter 3 was +0.4% (+1.5% y/y). The main reason for this has been the sharp increase in inflation, caused by the devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum, feeding increases in the cost of imports into the economy. This has caused, in turn, a reduction in consumer disposable income and spending power and so the services sector of the economy, accounting for around 80% of GDP, has seen weak growth as consumers cut back on their expenditure. However, more recently there have been encouraging statistics from the **manufacturing sector** which is seeing strong growth, particularly as a result of increased demand for exports. It has helped that growth in the EU, our main trading partner, has improved significantly over the last year while robust world growth has also been supportive. However, this sector only

accounts for around 10% of GDP so expansion in this sector will have a much more muted effect on the overall GDP growth figure for the UK economy as a whole.

While the Bank of England is expected to give forward guidance to prepare financial markets for gradual changes in policy, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC), meeting of 14 September 2017** managed to shock financial markets and forecasters by suddenly switching to a much more aggressive tone in terms of its words around warning that Bank Rate will need to rise soon. The Bank of England Inflation Reports during 2017 have clearly flagged up that it expected CPI inflation to peak at just under 3% in 2017, before falling back to near to its target rate of 2% in two years' time. The Bank revised its forecast for the peak to just over 3% at the 14 September meeting. (Inflation actually came in at 3.0% in both September and October so that might prove now to be the peak.) This marginal revision in the Bank's forecast can hardly justify why the MPC became so aggressive with its wording; rather, the focus was on an emerging view that with unemployment having already fallen to only 4.3%, the lowest level since 1975, and improvements in productivity being so weak, that **the amount of spare capacity in the economy was significantly diminishing** towards a point at which they now needed to take action. In addition, the MPC took a more tolerant view of low wage inflation as this now looks like a common factor in nearly all western economies as a result of automation and globalisation. However, the Bank was also concerned that the withdrawal of the UK from the EU would effectively lead to a *decrease* in such globalisation pressures in the UK, and so this would cause additional inflationary pressure over the next few years.

At its 2 November meeting, the MPC duly delivered a 0.25% increase in Bank Rate. It also gave forward guidance that they expected to increase Bank Rate only twice more in the next three years to reach 1.0% by 2020. This is, therefore, not quite the 'one and done' scenario but is, nevertheless, a very relaxed rate of increase prediction in Bank Rate in line with previous statements that Bank Rate would only go up very gradually and to a limited extent.

However, some forecasters are flagging up that they expect growth to accelerate significantly towards the end of 2017 and then into 2018. This view is based primarily on the coming fall in inflation, (as the effect of the effective devaluation of sterling after the EU referendum drops out of the CPI statistics), which will bring to an end the negative impact on consumer spending power. In addition, a strong export performance will compensate for weak services sector growth. If this scenario was indeed to materialise, then the MPC would be likely to accelerate its pace of increases in Bank Rate during 2018 and onwards.

It is also worth noting the **contradiction within the Bank of England** between action in 2016 and in 2017 **by two of its committees**. After the shock result of the EU referendum, the **Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)** voted in August 2016 for emergency action to cut Bank Rate from 0.50% to 0.25%, restarting £70bn of QE purchases, and also providing UK banks with £100bn of cheap financing. The aim of this was to lower borrowing costs, stimulate demand for borrowing and thereby increase expenditure and demand in the economy. The MPC felt this was necessary in order to ward off their expectation that there would be a sharp slowdown in economic growth. Instead, the economy grew robustly, although the Governor of the Bank of England strongly maintained that this was *because* the MPC took that action. However, other commentators regard this emergency action by the MPC as being proven by events to be a mistake. Then in 2017, we had the **Financial Policy Committee (FPC)** of the Bank of England taking action in June and September over its concerns that cheap borrowing rates, and easy availability of consumer credit, had resulted in too rapid a rate of growth in consumer borrowing and in the size of total borrowing, especially of unsecured borrowing. It, therefore, took punitive action to clamp down on the ability of the main banks to extend such credit! Indeed, a PWC report in October 2017 warned that

credit card, car and personal loans and student debt will hit the equivalent of an average of £12,500 per household by 2020. However, averages belie wide variations in levels of debt with much higher exposure being biased towards younger people, especially the 25 - 34 year old band, reflecting their lower levels of real income and asset ownership.

One key area of risk is that consumers may have become used to cheap rates since 2008 for borrowing, especially for mortgages. It is a major concern that **some consumers may have over extended their borrowing** and have become complacent about interest rates going up after Bank Rate had been unchanged at 0.50% since March 2009 until falling further to 0.25% in August 2016. This is why forward guidance from the Bank of England continues to emphasise slow and gradual increases in Bank Rate in the coming years. However, consumer borrowing is a particularly vulnerable area in terms of the Monetary Policy Committee getting the pace and strength of Bank Rate increases right - without causing a sudden shock to consumer demand, confidence and thereby to the pace of economic growth.

Moreover, while there is so much uncertainty around the Brexit negotiations, consumer confidence, and business confidence to spend on investing, it is far too early to be confident about how the next two to three years will actually pan out.

Brexit timetable and process

- March 2017: UK government notifies the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50
- March 2019: initial two-year negotiation period on the terms of exit. In her Florence speech in September 2017, the Prime Minister proposed a two year transitional period after March 2019.
- UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy will leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the two year transitional period.
- The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.
- The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.
- If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.
- On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.
- The UK will then no longer participate in matters reserved for EU members, such as changes to the EU's budget, voting allocations and policies.

Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation

(i) County Council

- approval of annual strategy.
- budget consideration and approval.
- approval of the division of responsibilities.

(ii) Cabinet

- scrutinise the proposed annual strategy.
- approval of/amendments to the organisation's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices.

(iii) Resources and Fire & Rescue Overview and Scrutiny Committee

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body.
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations.

Appendix E

Specified Investments

All such investments will be sterling denominated, with maturities up to maximum of one year, meeting the minimum 'high' rating criteria where applicable.

	Minimum 'High' Credit Criteria	Use
DMO Deposit Facility	--	In-house
Term deposits: Local Authorities	--	In-house
Nationalised Banks	Short-term F1, Support 1	In-house and External Manager
Term deposits: UK Banks	Short-term F1, Long-term A, Viability a, Support 3	In-house and External Manager
Term deposits: Bank Council uses for current account	--	In-house and External Manager
Term deposits: UK Building Societies	Top five largest societies as reported semi-annually. (To be continually monitored)	In-house and External Manager
Term deposits: Overseas Banks	Short-term F1+, Long-term AA, Viability aa, Support 1	In-house and External Manager
Certificates of deposits issued by UK banks and building societies	Short-term F1, Long-term A, Viability a, Support 3	External Manager
Money Market Funds	AA	In-house and External Manager
UK Government Gilts, Treasury Bills	--	External Manager
Gilt Funds and Bond Funds	Long-term A-	External Manager

Non-Specified Investments

	* Minimum Credit Criteria	Use
Term deposits: UK banks and building societies with maturities in excess of one year with a maximum of three years allowed for in-house deposits	Short-term F1, Long-term A, Viability a, Support 3	In-house and External Manager
Fixed Term Deposit with Variable Rates and Variable Maturities	Short-term F1, Long-term A, Viability a+, Support 3	In-house and External Manager
Certificates of Deposits issued by UK banks and building societies	Short-term F1, Long-term A, Viability a, Support 3	External Manager
UK Government Gilts with maturities in excess of 1 year	--	External Manager
Local Authority Mortgage Scheme	As per scheme conditions	In-house
Investment in the Local Government Association Mutual Bond Agency, the local Government Money Market and Property investment vehicles managed on behalf of the Local Government Association by CCLA.	--	--
Local Authority wholly owned trading company	--	In-house

The maximum sum that can be deposited with a single organisation (with the exception of the Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility and Local Authorities) is £20m. Investments can be made to other Local Authorities with a maximum of £10m per individual authority.

Approved Countries for Investments

AAA

- Australia
- Canada
- Denmark
- Germany
- Netherlands
- Singapore
- Sweden
- Switzerland
- U.S.A.

AA+

- Finland

AA

- Abu Dhabi (UAE)
- France
- U.K.

The Treasury Management Role of the S151 (Responsible) Officer: Head of Finance

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports
- submitting budgets and budget variations
- receiving and reviewing management information reports
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit
- recommending the appointment of external service providers
- entering into repurchase transactions where appropriate

MINIMUM REVENUE PROVISION

1. What is a Minimum Revenue Provision?

Capital expenditure is generally expenditure on assets which have a life expectancy of more than one year e.g. buildings, vehicles, machinery etc. It would be impractical to charge the entirety of such expenditure to revenue in the year in which it was incurred and so such expenditure is spread over several years so as to try to match the years over which such assets benefit the local community through their useful life. The manner of spreading these costs is through an annual Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP).

Revised MRP guidance will be released for 2018/19 but it was not available when this report was drafted. No changes to current policy are anticipated but if required, a revised MRP policy will be presented to Members during 2018/19 financial year.

2. Statutory Duty

Statutory Instrument 2008 no. 414 s4 lays down that:

“A local authority shall determine for the current financial year an amount of minimum revenue provision that it considers to be prudent.”

There is no requirement to charge MRP where the Capital Financing Requirement is nil or negative at the end of the preceding financial year.

3. Government Guidance

Along with the above duty, the Government issued guidance in February 2008 which requires that a Statement on the Council’s policy for its annual MRP should be submitted to the full Council for approval before the start of the financial year to which the provision will relate.

The Council is legally obliged to “have regard” to the guidance, which is intended to enable a more flexible approach to assessing the amount of annual provision than was required under the previous statutory requirements. The guidance offers four main options under which MRP could be made with an overriding recommendation that the Council should make prudent provision to redeem its debt liability over a period which is reasonably commensurate with that over which the capital expenditure is estimated to provide benefits. The requirement to “have regard” to the guidance therefore means that:

- a. Although four main options are recommended in the guidance, there is no intention to be prescriptive by making these the only methods of charge under which a local authority may consider its MRP to be prudent.
- b. It is the responsibility of each authority to decide upon the most appropriate method of making a prudent provision, after having had regard to the guidance.

4. Warwickshire County Council Policy

We have decided not to use any of the options outlined in the statutory guidance but to adopt an alternative approach, which we believe is prudent.

The MRP provision will be calculated on the average remaining useful life of the Council's asset portfolio. We will calculate and apply the remaining useful life over two categories of asset:

- Land, buildings and infrastructure;
- Vehicles, plant and equipment.

The proportion of debt outstanding in each category of asset will be determined by the value of assets included in the balance sheet at the end of each financial year.

The 2017 review shows that the remaining useful life of our assets is now 28 years. By using an average life of 28 years for our assets equates to an annual provision of 4% straight line MRP.

For vehicles, plant and equipment, the remaining useful life is assumed to be five years e.g. 5 years average remaining useful life will result in 20% straight line MRP.

Appendix I

As part of the revised CIPFA code on Treasury Management there is a requirement for the Council to look at long term affordability over the life of the underlying debt levels of the authority.

The graph below shows current debt levels to maturity and the associated costs to service the loans. It does not take into account any further capital expenditure or any future re-financing.

All levels are within the 2017/18 Operational Boundary approved by County Council in March 2017.

